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GST implications for the recovery of legal costs 
 
By Sheryl Jackson and Paul Garrett 
 
Introduction 
 
The provision of legal services for consideration is a “taxable supply”1 for which the 
provider is liable to pay goods and services tax (“GST”).2   
 
The liability to pay GST rests with the provider of the taxable supply, the practitioner. In 
the ordinary course, however, the provider of legal services will incorporate into the cost 
of those services an amount which represents its GST liability, whether it is specifically 
stated under the Costs Agreement  or its equivalent or not. If the client is an entity which 
is registered for the purposes of GST, and the services on which GST is paid are used for 
the purposes of an enterprise carried on by the client,  the client  is entitled to an input 
credit of an amount equal to the GST which was payable by the practitioner as the 
provider of the taxable supply.3 This credit can be set off against the client’s own GST 
obligations.  
 
This will not apply for clients who are not registered for GST purposes, for example 
plaintiffs in actions for damages for personal injuries. These clients are not able to obtain 
a credit for the component of the costs reflecting the supplier’s liability for GST. 
 
A number of questions arise when a party who is entitled to an input tax credit on legal 
fees is entitled to recover some or all of those fees under a judgment or negotiated 
settlement. These include the issue whether professional legal costs or outlays 
recoverable by the party who is entitled to the input tax credit should be reduced by the 
amount of the input tax credit, in recognition of the fundamental principle that the 
primary purpose of an award of costs is to indemnify the successful party, not to permit 
that party to make a profit. Unlike the position which applies if a party has obtained an 
income tax deduction for expenditure on legal fees and subsequently recovers part or all 
of those fees under a court order or settlement, there is no reimbursement mechanism to 
require an adjustment in respect of the input credit.4 
 
The practice of the Registrar in Queensland in undertaking costs assessments, whether on 
the standard basis or the indemnity basis, has been to reduce the assessed costs for 
entities registered for GST by the amount of the input tax credit i.e. by one eleventh. The 
reduction has been applied to both outlays and professional fees. It appears that, at least 
until very recently, a similar practice has been adopted in several other jurisdictions, 
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1  A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 ss 9-5, 9-10. 
 
2 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 ss 7-1, 9-40. 
 
3 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 ss 11-20, 11-25. 
 
4 See further the discussion under: “Goods and Services Tax Ruing GSTR 2001/4” below. 
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including in South Australia and in the Federal Court.5 The reduction has been justified 
on the basis that it was necessary in order to limit the amount recovered to an indemnity. 
This was the approach the Senior Deputy Registrar (“the registrar”) had taken on an 
assessment of costs on the standard basis in the recent case of Hennessey Glass and 
Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QDC 37 (“Hennessey Glass”).6 
The case involved a review under r 742 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) 
of the decision of the registrar on a reconsideration under r 741 of those rules of decisions 
made in the course of an assessment of a costs statement filed on behalf of the plaintiff. 
McGill SC DCJ disagreed with the approach taken by the registrar, and concluded that it 
would not normally be appropriate to make the deduction when determining amounts to 
be allowed for professional fees. In its very recent decision in ChongHerr Investments 
Ltd v Titan Sandstone Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 278 the Queensland Court of Appeal agreed 
with Judge McGill’s views, but the judgment in the Court of Appeal did not include any 
considered discussion of the issues involved. 
 
The question of the appropriate treatment of GST in relation to costs recovery is a very 
important one in commercial litigation. Frequently parties who are registered for GST 
will be entitled to the benefit of costs orders in their favour, or will be parties to out-of-
court settlements which include provision for payment of their legal costs. As a party’s 
legal costs in complex commercial litigation can reach a seven figure sum, a reduction of 
one eleventh has a very significant impact. The analysis in Hennessey Glass may be 
applicable in other jurisdictions. The issues warrant exploration. 
 
The indemnity principle 
 
Courts possess a statutory power to award costs and in the ordinary course the party who 
is unsuccessful will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party.7 
 
The rationale for this general principle was explained by McHugh J, with whose reasons 
Brennan CJ expressed general agreement, in Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 
193 CLR 72 at 978 in the following terms: 
 
The principle is grounded in reasons of fairness and policy and operates whether 
the successful party is the plaintiff or the defendant. Costs are not awarded to 
punish an unsuccessful party. The primary purpose of an award of costs is to 
indemnify the successful party.9 If the litigation had not been brought, or 
                                                 
5  The issue is not addressed in reported cases from those jurisdictions, but the practice was referred to in 
the written submissions for the plaintiff in Merringtons Pty Ltd v Luxottica Real Estate Australia Pty Ltd 
unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, No 9435 of 2005, Master Wood, 16.6.2006 at para 7. 
 
6  It was accepted on the facts of this case that the plaintiff was registered for GST purposes and obtained 
input tax credits for any GST it had paid, and that this would include any amount paid by its solicitors as 
outlays and reimbursed by the plaintiff. 
 
7  In several jurisdictions the rules of court specify that, without limiting the court’s discretion, the usual 
order will be that costs follow the event: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 42.1; Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 689; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 101.02, Supreme Court Civil Rules 
2006 (SA) r 263(1); Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 66 r 1. See also Colgate-Palmolive 
Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 232; 118 ALR 248. 
 
8  See also Hawthorne Cuppaidge & Badgery v Channell [1992] 2 QdR 488. 
 
9 Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 543 per Mason CJ; at 562-563 per Toohey J; at 566-567 per 
McHugh J; Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 410 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and 
McHugh JJ. 
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defended, by the unsuccessful party the successful party would not have incurred 
the expense which it did. As between the parties, fairness dictates that the 
unsuccessful party typically bears the liability for the costs of unsuccessful 
litigation. 
 
The principle that the primary purpose of a costs order is to provide an indemnity to the 
successful party (“the indemnity principle”) applies regardless of the basis on which costs 
are assessed. However, costs assessed on the party and party basis (or its equivalent) 
“were never intended to be comprehensive compensation for any loss suffered by a 
litigant.”10 Rather, they are intended to provide a qualified indemnity for costs, in that 
they extend to “all costs necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for enforcing 
or defending the rights of the party whose costs are being taxed.”11 
 
If a party entitled to recover costs has received an input credit for GST, the question 
arises as to whether the amount recovered by the party who has obtained the input tax 
credit should be reduced by the amount of the input tax credit, to ensure that party does 
not make a profit, consistent with the indemnity principle. The answer may vary, 
depending upon the nature of the costs and the basis on which they are assessed. It may 
also depend upon the specific requirements of the legislation and rules of court in each 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
Goods and Services Tax Ruling GSTR 2001/4 
The Commissioner has issued a public ruling, GST 2001/412, in relation to GST consequences of 
court orders and out of court settlements. The ruling provides guidance as to the Commissioner’s 
interpretation of the law as it applies to a number of the issues under consideration here. In 
relation to the position when a successful party is able to recover costs wholly or partly 
through a court order for costs or by negotiation of an amount in a settlement, it suggests: 
148. As we have seen for a supply to be a taxable supply the conditions under 
section 9-5 of the GST Act must be met. In the instance of the payment of costs 
under the court order or settlement there is no supply for consideration from the 
successful party to the unsuccessful party. This is essentially paying 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 Cachia v Hanes [1994] 179 CLR 403 at 410-411.  
 
11 Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 62 r 19. For the equivalent rules in other jurisdictions see: Court 
Procedure Rules 2006  (ACT) r 1751(2); Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia 
r 63.26 (Costs on the standard basis are “a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred”, 
with any doubt as to whether the costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount to be 
resolved in favour of the paying party); Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 703(2); Supreme 
Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 101.07(6)(a) (Costs as between party and party are “costs which have been 
necessarily and reasonably incurred by the party in the conduct of the litigation.”; Supreme Court Civil 
Rules 2006 (SA) r 264 (Party and party basis are “costs reasonably incurred by the party in the conduct of 
the litigation to an extent determined by reference to the scale of costs in force under those rules or the 
previous rules, when the costs were incurred.”; Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) r 859(a); Supreme Court 
(General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) rr 63.29, 63.69; In  New South Wales the costs ordered 
between parties (“party/party costs”) are those that are “fair and reasonable” having regard to all relevant 
circumstances: Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) ss 364, 365, 367A. 
 
12 Goods and Services Tax Ruling GSTR 2001/4.  Goods and Services Tax: GST consequences of court 
orders and out of court settlements. 
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compensation for costs or losses incurred in the dispute and will be treated in the 
same manner as damages under paragraphs 110 and 111.  
149. Accordingly, the payment of court ordered costs or costs negotiated in a 
settlement in the circumstances described will not be consideration for an earlier 
or current supply. It does not matter that the payment of the costs order or settled 
amount is made by an entity other than the unsuccessful party. The costs order or 
settled amount should take account of any entitlement to an input tax credit of the 
parties to the original supply.  
Paragraphs 150-152 provide an example of the implications when the party recovering 
costs is an unregistered entity.13  
The ruling then provides the following example of the implications when the party 
recovering costs is a registered entity: 
Example - Registered entity  
153. ABC Co, a registered transport company, sues for compensation for damages 
arising out of breach of a contract it has with a major retailer. Prior to any court 
proceedings being issued, a settlement is reached whereby the retailer agrees to 
pay the estimate of damages and a percentage of the costs incurred by ABC Co in 
bringing the action, for example, for the recovery of dishonoured cheque fees, 
costs of issuing a letter of demand, or court filing fees etc.  
154. ABC Co is able to claim an input tax credit for the GST included in the fees 
charged by its legal representatives.14 The actual cost to ABC Co is a GST 
exclusive amount. Consequently the parties should take this into account 
when negotiating the amount that will be paid in respect of costs.  
155. As with a court ordered award of costs, the payment of costs to ABC Co 
under the settlement arrangements is not a payment for a supply made by ABC 
Co. It is a payment akin to damages and there is no GST liability for ABC Co 
arising from the receipt of the payment.  
The Commissioner’s recommendation in the ruling that the costs order or settled amount 
should take account of any entitlement of the party recovering costs to an input credit 
reflects an acceptance by the Commissioner that the payment of costs under an order or 
settlement to a registered entity which was entitled to an input credit in relation to GST 
paid on the legal costs will have no effect on that input credit.15 This view is supported on 
examination of the provisions of the legislation: the recovery by a registered entity of 
some or all of its legal costs under a judgment or negotiated settlement is not one of the 
                                                 
13 This was the situation under consideration in Thornton v Apollo Nominees Pty Ltd [2005] TASSC 38. 
 
14 ABC Co’s solicitor is responsible for the GST liability on the supply of legal services to ABC Co. 
 
15 The position in relation to the recovery of costs may be contrasted with that when a payment made under 
a court order or out-of-court settlement is also a repayment of consideration wholly or in part for an earlier 
supply.  In this situation, an adjustment will be required: See the statement in relation to this principle and  
examples provided in GSTR 2001/4 at  paras 104, 129 and 133-136. 
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specified “adjustment events”16 which require an adjustment17 to the net amount18 of GST 
to be paid by the registered entity for a tax period.19 
Payment of costs under order or negotiated settlement  
 
The payment of costs to a party entitled to recover those costs under a court order or out-
of court settlement is not for a taxable supply by the party receiving the costs, and the 
amount paid is not consideration for the supply of legal services to the party paying those 
costs. These payments are made in the nature of an indemnity towards the successful 
litigant’s costs that have been paid to its solicitors. It is the view of the Tax Office that 
the payment does not itself attract any liability for GST.20 This interpretation is consistent 
with the treatment of damages and treats the payment of costs in these circumstances as 
an extension of the damages principle.21 
  
GST liability as recoverable costs or expense under costs order or settlement 
 
Cost to be recovered from an opposing party will ordinarily be assessed on the party and 
party basis, or its equivalent22  As has been seen, this form of assessment permits the 
recovery of all costs necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for enforcing or 
defending the rights of the party whose costs are being assessed.23 Absent any 
consideration of the effect of the entitlement of the party recovering costs to an input 
credit, the amount of any GST liability in respect of the services provided and 
disbursements incurred by a party’s legal advisers that is reflected in the amount of the  
fee charged to the client is clearly part of the costs which are recoverable on an 
assessment of costs on the standard basis as being a necessary and proper expenditure. 
 
                                                 
16  A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 Division 19, s 195-1 (Dictionary). 
 
17  A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 ss 19-10, 195-1 (Dictionary). 
 
18  For relevant purposes, the “net amount” is the net amount for the tax period applying to the enterprise as 
calculated by taking the sum of all the GST for which the enterprise is liable on the taxable supplies 
attributable to the tax period, and deducting from it the sum of all the input tax credits to which the 
enterprise is entitled for that period: A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 ss 17-5, 195-1 
(Dictionary). 
 
19 The only case in which reference has been made to the impact, if any, of the recovery of costs on the 
input credit previously allowed is Hennessey Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd 
[2007] QDC 37 at [130]. McGill DCJ noted that the Tax Ruling GSTR 2001/4 and other cases to which he 
had referred proceeded on the assumption that there was no impact, and he proceeded to examine the 
consequential issues on that basis. 
 
20 Goods and Services Tax Ruling GSTR 2001/4.  Goods and Services Tax: GST consequences of court 
orders and out of court settlements, paras 110-111, 148-152, 155. 
 
21  See Thornton v Apollo Nominees Pty Ltd [2005] TASSC 38 at  [6] per Evans J and Merringtons Pty 
Limited v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Ltd Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, No 9435 of 2005, 
Master Wood, 16.6.2006, at para 12. 
 
22 The rules of court in some jurisdictions specifically state this: Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r 
1751; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 42.2; Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northern 
Territory of Australia rr 63.28, 63.58;Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 703(1); Supreme Court 
Rules 1987 (SA) r 107(6)(b), Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 264(2);  Supreme Court (General 
Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 63.31.  
 
23 See note 11. 
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The issue was considered in relation to the relevant rule of court in Tasmania24 in 
Thornton v Apollo Nominees Pty Ltd [2005] TASSC 38 (“Thornton”). The appellant in 
that case was entitled to recover costs against the respondent under two orders made in 
his favour. Each bill contained items relating to GST payable in respect of legal services 
provided to the appellant by his solicitors and disbursements incurred on his behalf. The 
taxing officer had refused to allow these items because he considered that as a matter of 
principle they were not allowable. Evans J sustained the appellant’s objection and 
allowed the items claimed in each bill in respect of GST. In the course of his judgment he 
said:25: 
 
“… it is to my mind very clear that any liability for GST payable in respect of the 
provision of those services that is passed on to the appellant is also a cost or 
expense that was necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for 
maintaining or defending the rights of the appellant. Rule 837A provides that a 
bill of costs for taxation may include an amount referable to GST paid or to be 
paid and that the taxing officer may make an allowance for the same. There is 
accordingly no basis for any suggestion that a GST expense is for some reason or 
other an expense that is beyond the range of expenses that are recognised by 
r859.” 
 
It is submitted that although the Evans J was correct in concluding that the amount paid 
by the appellant which was referable to the GST paid by the provider of the legal services 
was properly within the range of expenses recognised by r859, the reference in the 
judgment that the liability for GST is “passed on to the appellant” is inaccurate. Liability 
for GST rests with the supplier.26 This liability will be taken into account by the provider 
of the legal services in determining amount of the bill to the client but, regardless of the 
nomenclature used, it remains a part of the total fee charged to the client.  
 
It has been seen that Evans J found support for his conclusion in relation to the 
application of r 859 to the two items in dispute in Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) 
r837A. That rule stipulates: 
837A Goods and services tax 
A bill of costs for taxation may include as a disbursement an amount referable to 
tax paid or to be paid under the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 
1999 of the Commonwealth and the Taxing Officer is to make such allowance as 
is appropriate for the impact of the GST, within the meaning of that Act, on the 
bill of costs. 
 
As Stacey has noted, this rule is ripe for misinterpretation.27 Commercial contracts 
between GST-registered entities commonly express the price as a GST-exclusive amount. 
If the contract is expressed in that way, the contract will also oblige the recipient to pay 
an additional amount which equates to the amount of the supplier’s GST liability on the 
supply. However, regardless of whether the price for the legal services is expressed 
simply as a total (which includes an amount referable to the provider’s liability for GST) 
                                                 
24  Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) r 859. 
 
25 [2005] TASSC 38 at [4]. 
26 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) sections 7-1 (GST and input credits); 9-5 
(Taxable supplies), 9-10 (Meaning of supply), 9-40 Liability for GST on taxable supplies. 
 
27 Paul Stacey, “A juggling act: the confusion of GST in costs orders” (2007) LIJ 30 at 32-33. 
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or as a GST-exclusive amount and a separate amount referable to the supplier’s liability 
for GST, the consideration (and therefore the price) of the taxable supply is the same.  
 
If a litigant seeks to recover costs based on the contractual liability, r 837A provides 
express authority to the taxing officer to allow both items (i.e. the GST-exclusive price 
and the separate component of the total price for the services referable to the supplier’s 
liability for GST). This was apparently the situation before the Court in Thornton. 
However, in the situation where the contract is silent about GST, the litigant will be 
contractually liable to pay an amount which will be a GST-inclusive price. The taxing 
officer should then choose not to exercise any discretion to include an amount referable 
to the supplier’s GST liability because to do so in that circumstance would be to 
overcompensate the litigant. 
 
There was also some consideration of this issue in Keen v Telstra Corporation Limited. 
[2006] FCA 834. In that case the party with the benefit of the costs order, who was not 
registered for GST and therefore had no entitlement to any input credit for GST paid, was 
seeking to add, in addition to the amount allowed under the relevant scale, the amount 
paid as GST on the professional costs paid to its solicitor. Rares J rejected this claim. The 
basis for the rejection, however, was that under O 62 r 12(1) of the Federal Court Rules 
1979 (Cth) the amounts allowed for professional fees were the amounts specified in the 
applicable scales in the second schedule, and that these scales were inclusive of GST. It 
would be doubly compensatory were a further or separate disbursement to be allowed on 
a taxation of costs in respect of GST.28   Further, the Court Scale mandates the 
methodology of the calculation of the recoverable costs to give effect to the nature of the 
indemnity (party and party costs) and generally has no reference to the method of 
charging between the solicitor and the client. 
 
Clearly the same principles apply to costs recoverable on the more generous “solicitor 
and client” or the “indemnity” basis of assessment.29 Regardless of the manner in which 
the consideration for the supply of the legal services is expressed in the contract with the 
provider of the legal services, a party entitled to recover costs under an order or 
settlement will be entitled to recover the amount referable to GST paid on professional 
fees or disbursements, unless an issue arises involving the impact of a party’s entitlement 
to an input credit for that amount. 
 
Outlays 
 
(a) disbursements fully recovered 
 
The outlays charged to a client are ordinarily discrete items of expenditure which may be 
fully covered by the amount recovered from the other side under an order for recovery of 
costs. In respect of GST, if an amount referable to GST has been paid on a particular 
outlay and claimed as an input tax credit, it is logical and consistent with the indemnity 
principle that the amount recovered under an assessment on the standard basis from the 
other party should be the amount of the outlays net of GST.  
 
This is the approach which has been taken in the authorities which have considered the 
issue. In Merringtons Pty Ltd v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Ltd Unreported, Supreme 
                                                 
28 [2006] FCA 834 at [47]. 
 
29 See notes 69 and 70.  
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Court of Victoria. No 9435 of 2005, Master Wood, 16.6.2006 (“Merringtons”) Master 
Wood contrasted the position in relation to outlays with the scales for professional costs, 
and emphasised the difference that the allowances for disbursements were entirely 
discretionary. He was satisfied that to allow the GST component to remain as part of the 
disbursement in such circumstances would be to allow “double dipping.” His example 
clearly illustrates the point30: 
Assume that an amount of $11,000, inclusive of GST of $1000, is paid as a 
disbursement for counsel’s fee. An input credit would mean the actual cost to the 
party is $10,000.  By claiming $11,000 in the bill the party would be recovering 
more than the expense incurred if the bill were to be taxed at any figure between 
$10,001 and $11,000. If, for example, the figure is taxed at $11,000, then the GST 
component of $1,000 is received in addition to an input tax credit for that sum. 
The party would then recover the equivalent of $12,000.  
 
As the Master concluded: “A party/party taxation is to provide an indemnity or partial 
indemnity not a profit.” 
 
McGill SC DCJ agreed with and followed this approach in Hennessey Glass.31  
 
Although both of the authorities which have examined this issue involved an assessment 
of costs on the “party and party” or “standard” basis, it is clear the principle is equally 
applicable to an assessment on the more generous indemnity, or solicitor and client, basis. 
 
(b) Disbursements only partially recovered  
 
The discussion in (a) above is premised on the basis that the outlays will usually be 
discrete items of expenditure which are fully covered by the amount recovered from the 
other side under an order or settlement. However, this may not always be the case and it 
is not uncommon in assessments on the party and party basis for disbursements such as 
fees to expert witnesses or counsel’s fees to be reduced on assessment.  
 
To adjust the example in Merrington’s case extracted above: if counsel’s fees were 
allowed at $9,900 only, the party entitled to the input credit (i.e. whose actual cost was 
$10,000) would not in fact be making a profit on the disbursement even if no reduction of 
one-eleventh (i.e. $90) was made.  
 
In Hennessey Glass32 McGill DCJ observed that counsel’s fees might be an exception to 
the principle that an outlay will ordinarily be fully covered by the amount recovered from 
the other side under an order for costs on the standard basis. He was satisfied, however, 
that the exception should not distort the general approach that the amount recovered 
should be the amount of the outlays net of GST. It is submitted this conclusion is clearly 
                                                 
30 Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, No 9435 of 2005, Master Wood, 16.6.2006, at para 36. The 
Master noted (at para 38) that the Supreme Court Rules (Tas) r 837A  in relation to disbursements 
specifically authorised  the Taxing Officer to make an “appropriate allowance” for GST, but he found the 
absence of an equivalent rule in Victoria was not significant. The rules of court in other jurisdictions 
relating to the recovery of outlays similarly make no specific mention of an allowance for GST. 
 
31 Hennessey Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QDC 37 at [141]-[142]. The 
Queensland Court of Appeal agreed with this view in ChongHerr Investments Ltd v Titan Sandstone Pty 
Ltd [2007] QCA 278 at [9]. 
 
32 Hennessey Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QDC 37 at [142]. 
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appropriate. It may be that this is different to the approach which might now be expected 
to be taken in Queensland on an assessment of professional fees on the standard basis, 
which is that no reduction is to be made for any input credit. As will be seen below, 
however, the primary basis for this conclusion is that the relevant rules provide scale 
amounts to be recovered for particular items, and that there is no discretion to reduce this 
amount. This rationale is not applicable to the recovery of disbursements. 
 
A final point may be made about the exercise of the discretion in relation to allowances 
for disbursements which may be allowed only in part. This is that the amount referable to 
GST which should be deducted because the party recovering costs has the ability to claim 
an input tax credit should be deducted before consideration is given to the 
appropriateness or otherwise of the disbursement.33 
 
(c) Disbursements not attracting GST  
 
As McGill DCJ pointed out in Hennessey Glass34, outlays should be considered 
individually and a reduction made to account for GST only for the outlays on which an 
amount referable to GST was paid.  
 
Although this will be the case with respect to most outlays, it is likely there will be some 
which did not attract GST. A common example is court filing fees35. Another possibility 
would be the fee paid to an overseas expert who is engaged in and prepares a report in his 
or her home jurisdiction.36 There would have been no GST paid, and no entitlement to an 
input credit, in respect of these items, and consequently no reduction should be made on 
an assessment of costs. 
 
Professional fees – assessment on the party and party basis 
 
(a) application of scales for recovery of professional fees on the party and party basis 
 
The recovery of costs on the party and party basis (or its equivalent) of professional fees 
(not outlays) on which an amount referable to GST has been paid and an input credit 
claimed requires separate consideration. Merringtons37 was the first case in which the 
issue was considered in some detail. In that case Master Wood posed the relevant 
question succinctly in the following terms: 
“…the issue for determination is whether the client who receives an input tax 
credit for the GST amount ought to receive a sum representing the GST 
component from a taxation of costs. In other words, has that party been 
                                                 
33 Merringtons Pty Limited v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Ltd Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, No 
9435 of 2005, Master Wood, 16.6.2006, at para 42. 
 
34 Hennessey Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QDC 37 at [142]. 
35  A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 ss 81-5, 195-1.  “Australian Government 
Agency” encompasses the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, or an authority of the Commonwealth or 
of a State or a Territory: Income Tax Assessment Act Assessment Act 1997 s 995.1.    
36 A taxable supply is one made where the supply is for consideration, in the course of or furtherance of an 
enterprise carried on by the supplier which is connected with Australia, and the supplier is required to be 
registered or GST purposes: A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 s 9-5. 
 
37 Merringtons Pty Ltd v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Ltd  Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, No 
9435 of 2005, Master Wood, 16.6.2006, at para 16. 
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effectively reimbursed via an input tax credit, and is adding the sum into a bill of 
costs in those circumstances open to challenge on the basis that it is no longer a 
“liability38”. Clearly, party/party costs are not intended to over-compensate a 
successful party or put them in a more favourable position than they would 
otherwise have been.” 
 
Master Wood first observed that at the time of the introduction of the GST on 1 July 
2000, a number of Court costs scales were increased to make allowance for the impact of 
GST39.  He also noted that it has long been accepted that the Taxing Master has a wide 
discretion to allow more than the scale charge, but that there was no general discretion to 
allow less than the scale items except in circumstances where there was an express power 
to do so.40 Although there may be some particular exemptions where the taxing officer 
has a discretion to reduce a scale item, the Victorian scale does not include a discretion to 
reduce the Scale having regard to the impact of GST.  
 
The relevant rule under the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic), r 
63.34(1), provides: “Subject to paragraph (3), the solicitor for the party to whom costs are 
payable shall be entitled to charge and be allowed the fees set forth in Appendix A.”41  
Master Wood contrasted the position under the scale in Appendix A with the position in a 
range of other jurisdictions outside Australia where specific provision has been made for 
the treatment of value added tax42 or its equivalent in bills of costs.43 In England, for 
example, paragraph 5.3 of the Practice Direction about Costs, which supplements parts 
43-48 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) states: 
“V.A.T. should not be included in a claim for costs if the receiving party is able to 
recover the V.A.T. as an input tax.” 
 
The Master said that the applicable paragraphs of the public ruling, and the example 
provided in it for a registered entity, as have been set out above, were consistent with the 
approach to costs taken in England and with the view that regard must be paid to the 
                                                 
38 The Master had previously noted that the order for costs on a party/party basis indemnifies in respect of 
“liability” for professional fees necessarily and reasonably incurred: Latoudis v Casey (1901) 170 CLR 
534. 
 
39  The Supreme Court of Victoria scale was adjusted on 1 July 2000, when it was increased by about 9.5% 
to take account of the introduction of GST. In Queensland, Justice Legislation (Variation of Fees and 
Costs) Regulation 2001 (SL No 111/2001) sections 25-27 replaced the previous scale of costs schedules 
with scales specifying GST-inclusive amounts).   
 
40  See Re: Fat-Sel Pty Limited and Brambles Holdings Limited (1985) 2 FCR 440, 61ALR 536; Russo v 
Russo (1953) VLR at 63, Re Ermen (1903) 2 Ch 156.  
 
41  Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic). Rule 63.34(3) and (4) give the Court, and 
with the direction of the Court the Taxing Master, a discretion to increase the charges allowed on taxation 
by up to 30% if the nature and importance or the difficulty of the case justifies this. 
 
42 Value Added Tax Act 1994 (UK) This legislation establishes a similar regime to that established in 
Australia by A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth). 
 
43 See eg Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 (Ireland), O 99 r 1(6). Reference was also made to the decision 
In Price Waterhouse Myernel v The Thoroughbred Breeders Association of South Africa (2003) (3) SA 54.  
Howie J (with whom Hefer AP, Vivier ADP, Harms and Conradie JJA agreed) concluded (at 61) that 
before the winner could recover VAT under a costs order it was necessary to show that the items in the bill 
were costs in the true sense, namely that the were expenses which actually left the winner out of pocket, 
and this could not be said of the VAT amount for which the recovering party was entitled to claim from the 
Revenue, as an input tax.  
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impact of the capacity of the recipient to claim an input tax credit.44 He also noted the 
submission put before him that consistency ought to be maintained and there was no legal 
basis to treat professional fees and disbursements differently in relation to GST. Though 
accepting the attractiveness of this argument, the Master could find no legal basis to treat 
them the same. Unlike the discretionary position applying in relation to outlays, he was 
persuaded that there was no discretion under the Victorian Scale to make a reduction on 
the costs items in the Scale on account of an entitlement to an input tax credit. He 
concluded45: 
 
“In my view, the question of the impact of GST in relation to the costs items in 
the Scale is clear cut. Put simply, the Scale is the Scale and although it was 
adjusted at the relevant time to include a component for GST, it does not take into 
account the impact upon the individual in the sense that Scale items are not 
capable of reduction due to any entitlement that the recipient may have in relation 
to input tax credit unless the Scale or Rules outline a discretion or power to do 
so.” 
 
The position in the Federal Court in relation to the scale for costs recoverable on the party 
and party basis is similar to that in Victoria.46 In Re: Fat Sel Pty Limited and Brambles 
Holdings Limited (1985) 2 FCR 440, 61 ALR 536 which was referred to by Master Wood 
in Merringtons, Beaumont J held that the Taxing Officer had no discretion to allow 
amounts claimed in the bill of costs under items 17 and 18 of the Scale in Schedule 2 of 
the Federal Court Rules 1979 at other than the scale, despite the view that the fees that 
would be allowed would appear prima facie unreasonable.47 
 
In Keen v Telstra Corporation Limited [2006] FCA 834, discussed above, Rares J was 
considering the position of a client who was not registered for GST. His Honour 
observed, however, as a “possible injustice” that a party who does not have the benefit of 
input tax credits against which to offset the GST liability to his or her solicitors will not 
have the same beneficial taxation and accounting consequence available to a business 
who is conducting litigation and recovers costs, and to that extent “will be worse off 
when receiving the benefit of an order for costs under the current provisions of the 
rules.”48 These comments were obiter, but the reasoning is consistent with the approach 
of Master Wood in Merringtons and assumes that professional costs allowed according to 
the scales provided in the rules are not to be reduced because there is included in the 
scale items an allowance for GST on which an input tax credit has been obtained. 
 
                                                 
44 Merringtons Pty Limited v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Ltd Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, No 
9435 of 2005, Master Wood, 16.6.2006, at para 32. 
 
45 Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, No 9435 of 2005, Master Wood, 16.6.2006, at para 34. 
 
46 Order 62 r 12(1) of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) provides: Except as otherwise ordered in all 
proceedings commenced on and after the date these Rules came into operation, solicitors are, subject to 
these Rules, entitled to charge and be allowed the fees set forth in the Second Schedule and higher fees 
shall not be allowed in any case except such as are by this Order otherwise provided for. See also Colgate 
Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 230 per Sheppard J. 
 
47 The amounts related to perusal of large numbers of folios of documents and scanning of large numbers of 
documents. The second schedule now specifies that the amounts to be allowed in these specific 
circumstances are “at the discretion of the taxing officer.” 
 
48 [2006] FCA 834 at [47]. 
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A similar position prevails in Queensland under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 
(Qld). In particular, r 690(1) provides: “For assessing costs on the standard basis under 
this part, a solicitor is entitled to charge and be allowed the costs under the scales of costs 
for work done for or in a proceeding in the court”.49 Rule 690(7) makes it explicit that the 
costs under the scale of costs for work done are inclusive of any GST payable in relation 
to the work.50 In Hennessey Glass51 McGill DCJ considered the position in relation to an 
assessment involving professional costs claimed and allowed under the District Court 
Scale in Schedule 2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). His Honour was 
satisfied the effect of the authorities referred to was that the operation of the GST system 
and the input tax credit system was not a basis for reducing the scale amounts allowed on 
an assessment on the standard basis.  
 
As is the case in the jurisdictions in which have been discussed, the rules of court in the 
Australian Capital Territory52 the Northern Territory53 South Australia54 and Western 
Australia55 provide for costs on the party and party basis to be recovered on the basis of 
the scales provided, and only in very specific circumstances do the rules or scales give 
any discretion in respect of the amounts allowed. The rationale expressed in Merringtons 
and in Hennessey Glass warrants consideration in those jurisdictions.  
 
The position in Tasmania may be distinguished. Rule 837(1) of the Supreme Court Rules 
2000 (Tas) specifies that the fees that a solicitor is entitled to charge are prescribed by 
Schedule 1. However, subrule (2) then stipulates that: “In special circumstances, instead 
of the fee prescribed for any item in schedule 1, the taxing officer may allow a greater or 
lesser fee in respect of that item.”   
 
It may be suggested that the taxing officer in Tasmania should use this discretion to 
reduce costs for solicitor’s fees where the party recovering costs can wholly, or partially, 
                                                 
49 The applicable schedule for the District Court (Schedule 2) permits, in part 1 (General), the making of a 
direction that costs to be allowed for counsel or solicitor are to be less than the costs under part 2, but the 
discretion may only be exercised by “the court or a judge”.  
 
50 This subrule was inserted by s 24 of Justice Legislation (Variation of Fees and Costs) Regulation 2001 
(Qld). There is an equivalent subrule in the Australian Capital Territory: Court Procedure Rules 2006 
(ACT) r 1722(2). 
 
51Hennessey Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QDC 37 at [138]. In 
ChongHerr Investments Ltd v Titan Sandstone Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 278 at [9] the Queensland Court of 
Appeal , in dealing with an assessment on the standard basis, agreed with the view of McGill DCJ that 
costs to be recovered for professional fees should not be reduced on account of input tax credit. 
 
52 Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r 1722(1) provides: “For assessing costs under this part, unless the 
court otherwise orders, a solicitor is entitled to charge, and be allowed, the costs under the prescribed scale 
of costs for work done for or in a proceeding in the court, multiplied by the prescribed percentage.” The 
prescribed percentage is determined in the manner specified in r 1722(3). There are only a couple of 
exceptions in the scale where the registrar has a discretion (e.g. under item 9 the amount “for brief in 
preparation of trial” is “the amount the registrar considers appropriate”. 
 
53  Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia  O 63 r 32. 
 
54 Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 101.07; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 264(2), 264(3). 
 
55  Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 66 r 11. A discretion is provided by O 66 r 23 for the registrar 
to allow an additional sum if the registrar considers that, by reason of special circumstances, a fee in any 
relevant scale is inadequate, The scales referred to are legal costs determinations within the meaning of the 
Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA). 
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claim input credits for GST. Certainly this would be consistent with the analysis of 
Master Wood in Merringtons.  However, McGill DCJ in Hennessey Glass reached a 
different conclusion in relation to the application of the indemnity principle to that 
reached by Master Wood in Merringtons. This is considered further below. Despite the 
presence of a discretion under these rules, Judge McGill’s analysis leaves open an 
argument that the entitlement to an input credit should not, on a taxation of party and 
party costs, be regarded as such “special circumstances” as to compel the exercise of the 
discretion to reduce the costs amounts allowed.  
 
In New South Wales, the rules of court do not prescribe a fixed scale of costs. Costs 
assessed on the ordinary basis will be appropriate “fair and reasonable costs” as assessed 
in accordance with the Legal Profession Act 200456.  
 
(b) application of the indemnity principle 
 
An interesting contrast between the decisions in Merringtons with that in Hennessey 
Glass relates to the manner in which the indemnity principle was dealt with. In 
Merringtons, Master Wood implicitly acknowledged that the conclusion he reached was 
inconsistent with the indemnity principle.57 In Hennessey Glass, however, McGill DCJ 
dealt with the indemnity principle directly, and found that in fact it was not infringed. 
Although acknowledging the validity of the principle, McGill DCJ found it to be a 
“hollow argument” to suggest that a party would recover more by way of party and party 
costs than the party had actually to spend in circumstances such as those with which he 
was dealing where the actual amount paid to the solicitors by the client was undoubtedly 
much more than the costs assessed on the standard basis. He said58: 
 
“…insofar as professional costs according to scale are concerned, there is no 
substance to the assertion that the plaintiff was “double-dipping”. In my 
experience, costs assessed on the standard basis usually amount to about half what 
the average solicitor actually charges the average client, so that if the approach 
adopted by Master Wood is applied in such a situation, there is no risk of the 
client in fact making a profit out of the costs, and in that way infringing the 
indemnity principle.” 
 
The views of McGill DCJ in this respect reflect the reality that there is a generally a 
substantial divergence between the amount of costs recovered under an order for party 
and party costs and the costs paid by the successful party to its own solicitor. Sheppard J 
acknowledged in Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 
at 226; 118 ALR 248 that: 
 
“It is a matter of notoriety that the indemnity for costs which one party recovers 
from another pursuant to the common order that one pay the costs of the other 
does not very often provide the party entitled to the benefit of the order with 
anything approaching a full indemnity for the costs which have in fact been 
incurred…In years gone past the divergence between costs incurred and costs 
                                                 
56 See esp. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). 
 
57  Merringtons Pty Limited v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Ltd Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 
No 9435 of 2005, Master Wood, 16.6.2006, at para 32. 
 
58 [2007] QDC 37 at [139]. 
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actually recovered on a party and party taxation was not so great, but it is clear 
that that divergence has existed at least until the last century and indeed before. 
The divergence arises in relation to litigation in most, if not all, courts.” 
 
(c) consistency with of Goods and Services Tax Ruling GSTR 2001/4? 
 
It may be argued that the decisions in Merringtons and Hennessey Glass in relation to 
assessment of costs on party and party basis (or its equivalents) where an input credit has 
been claimed for GST on professional fees are inconsistent with the view of the 
Commissioner in Goods and Services Tax Ruling GSTR 2001/4. Indeed, it is implicit in 
Master Wood’s comments in Merringtons that his conclusion was not consistent with the 
applicable paragraphs of the Ruling, which recommend that regard should be paid to the 
impact of the capacity of the recipient to claim an input tax credit.59 
 
In the case of the recovery of costs on a party and party basis, however, there is usually 
little connection between the basis on which the amount to be paid to the solicitor is 
calculated, and the basis upon which the amount to be recovered from the unsuccessful 
party is calculated. The former will usually be based on the costs agreement (or its 
equivalent) between the solicitor and the client. Although the actual cost to the client, if 
entitled to an input credit for an amount referable to GST, will be a GST-exclusive 
amount, this amount will be of minimal relevance in determining the costs to be 
recovered from another party on the party and party basis. Except in New South Wales, 
that amount will be determined by application of the scales in, or referred to in, the 
applicable rules of court. It is at least arguable that in these circumstances the 
recommendation  in the ruling that the parties should take account of any entitlement to 
an input tax credit of the parties to the original supply ought not be applicable to the 
amount to be recovered for professional fees. 
 
As is observed by the tax ruling, it is the amount of the input tax credit that is to be taken 
into account when costs are payable between parties. Unlike the position with outlays 
where there is a clearly identifiable amount to which an input tax credit applies, this is 
not the situation with the scales. Although the scales are GST inclusive, they do not 
represent the method of charging between the solicitor and the client and therefore no 
part has an amount allocated as an input tax credit. That is not to say the parties should 
not be aware of practical consequences discussed below. 
 
(d) practical implications  
 
The approach in Hennessey Glass will not mean that the fact that the party entitled to 
recover costs is an entity registered for GST will have no impact on the costs to be paid 
by the other party. “Outlays” such as counsel’s fees, fees for expert evidence etc may be 
very substantial, and it has been seen that the amount to be recovered on outlays will be 
fees net of GST.  Ordinarily however, a large component of the legal costs to be 
recovered will be for professional fees. It is to be expected that in Queensland the 
recovered costs on the standard basis will be GST inclusive. It has been seen that this 
approach may also be appropriate in several other jurisdictions in relation to the amounts 
allowed for professional fees on assessments on the party and party basis. 
 
                                                 
59 Goods and Services Tax Ruling GSTR 2001/4.  Goods and Services Tax: GST consequences of court 
orders and out of court settlements, paras 149, 154. 
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It has been noted that in reaching his decision in Hennessey Glass, McGill DCJ was 
satisfied that it was very unlikely that the application of the rules in this way would 
infringe the indemnity principle.  In the event that it did, however, his Honour recognised 
that there may need to be a reduction on the recoverable costs. He said:60 
It may be that, if the effect of an input tax credit meant that costs assessed on the 
standard basis plus the input tax credit came to an amount greater than the 
plaintiff had in fact paid the solicitor in respect of professional costs, the costs 
would have to be abated under the indemnity principle so that the client did not 
recover in total more than was actually paid. 
 
It is suggested that the solicitors for a party entitled to recover costs on the party and 
party basis, and who has obtained on input credit for the GST component for legal 
professional fees, should file an affidavit confirming that the legal professional costs paid 
by the party net of GST exceed the costs for professional fees claimed under the costs 
statement. If the interpretation in Hennessey Glass is followed, this will ensure that the 
circumstances fall within those in which McGill DCJ would certainly permit the recovery 
of the GST-inclusive amount, and will mean there is evidence from which an assessor or 
taxing officer may be satisfied that there can be no issue with the indemnity principle. 
 
Professional fees – assessments on the solicitor and client or indemnity basis 
 
The decisions which have been discussed in relation to the treatment of the GST 
component included in the professional costs charged to the party recovering all or 
portion of its costs have involved consideration of the quantum of costs to be recovered 
under a party and party costs order or its equivalent.61 This is certainly the basis upon 
which costs to be recovered from an opposing party will ordinarily be assessed.62  
 
The court may, however, order costs to be assessed on a more generous basis, with the 
most common of these being the solicitor and client or the indemnity basis. The court’s 
power to make such orders applies regardless of whether they there are specific rules of 
court in this respect63, although the rules in most jurisdictions do contemplate 
assessments on one or both of these bases.64 
 
                                                 
60  [2007] QDC 37 at [140]. 
 
61 See also Merringtons Pty Limited v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Ltd Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Victoria, No 9435 of 2005, Master Wood, 16.6.2006, at paras 13-16, 36. Though dealing with an 
assessment on the party/party basis, Master Wood noted (at para 40) in reaching his conclusion in relation 
to the treatment of GST paid on disbursements that the Taxing Master had a wide discretion in the 
assessment of disbursements to determine what is “necessary or proper” on a party/party taxation (Supreme 
Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 O 63.29) or “reasonable” in amount on solicitor and client 
basis (Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 r 63.30). 
 
62 Note 10. 
 
63 Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 226, 230 ;118 ALR 248. 
 
64 Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r 1752; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 42.5; Rules of 
the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia r 63.25; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 
(Qld) r 704(1) (In Queensland the rules provide only for the “indemnity” basis of assessment, but this 
equates to the traditional solicitor and client basis: r 743); Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 101.07, 
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 264(5); Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 
(Vic) r 63.28.. 
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In Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 232-234; 118 ALR 
248, Sheppard J discussed several categories of case in which the court may depart from 
the ordinary principles and order costs on the solicitor and client or indemnity basis, 
though also explaining that these categories are not closed65  As is clear from this 
judgment it is not uncommon for costs recoverable under a court order or settlement to be 
assessed on a basis other than the party and party basis. It is important to consider 
whether the treatment of the GST component included in the professional fees in those 
instances will differ from that applying on an assessment on the party and party basis. 
 
In broad terms the rules of court which provide for costs on a solicitor and client basis 
provide that the costs to be recovered on this basis extend to all costs reasonably incurred 
and of reasonable amount.66 Costs on the indemnity basis will generally extend to all 
costs other than those which are of unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably 
incurred, with any doubt in that regard to be resolved in favour of the party to whom the 
costs are payable.67  
 
In Queensland r 704(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) specifies that  
costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis will include all costs reasonably incurred and 
of a reasonable amount, having regard to the scale of fees prescribed for the court, any 
costs agreement between the party to whom the costs are payable and the party’s 
solicitor, and the charges ordinarily payable by a client to a solicitor for the work. The 
sub-rule has been interpreted liberally. The leading authority in relation to the 
interpretation of this subrule is Bottoms v Reser.68 In that case De Jersey CJ said69 that the 
sub-rule “encompasses all costs except so far as they may be of unreasonable amount or 
where unreasonably incurred.”  He proceeded70:  
 
                                                 
65 Note also that if an offer of compromise has been made under the applicable rules of court, the general 
discretion for the awarding of costs must be read subject to those rules, which will in some circumstances 
require the awarding of costs on the solicitor and client basis [Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) Order 41 
(offers by plaintiff to settle) Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) Chapter 7 Pt 11 (offers of settlement)] or 
the indemnity basis [Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) Order 23 (offer of compromise); Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) Pt 42, Div 3 (offers of compromise); Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 
(Qld) Ch 9 Pt 5 (offers to settle) esp. r 361; Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) 
Order 26 (offers to compromise and offers to compromise on appeal)]. 
 
66 See: Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r1752(3). Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 101.07, Supreme 
Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 264(5) (This rules provides “full reimbursement for costs reasonably 
incurred by the party in the conduct of the litigation”. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 
2005 (Vic) r 63.30. 
  
67 See: Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r; Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of 
Australia rr 63.27, 63.32; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 101.07(6); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 
(SA) r 264(5)(b); Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 63.30.1(1). In New South 
Wales indemnity costs will usually extend to “all costs (other than those that appear to have been 
unreasonably incurred or appear to be of unreasonable amount”). However, in respect of costs payable out 
of property held or controlled by a person who is party to the proceedings, either in the capacity of trustee, 
executor, administrator or legal representative of a deceased estate, or in any other fiduciary capacity, it 
will encompass costs other than those incurred in breach of the person’s  duty in that capacity. 
 
68 [2000] QSC 413. The approach of De Jersey CJ in this case was recently approved by the Queensland 
Court of Appeal in Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 235. See also Henley v State of 
Queensland [2006] QDC 94; Hook v Boreham & QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited [2006] QDC 304. 
 
69 [2000] QSC 413, at page 4. 
 
70 [2000] QSC 413 at page 5. 
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I emphasise my view that in such an assessment, no niggardly or unduly approach 
would be warranted…It would be odd, in short, if parties having agreed upon an 
indemnity assessment, contemplated the possibility of a Registrar’s substantially 
cutting back upon the costs to be allowed, thereby leaving the donee of the order 
bereft of the indemnity envisaged. That is why the ultimate limitation is itself 
restricted to the unreasonable, but “unreasonable” viewed in the overall context – 
which invites consideration expressly of the terms of the agreement between the 
client and the solicitor. 
 
Unlike the position in respect of costs on the standard or party/party basis an assessor is 
not required to allow a scale amount, bereft of any discretion to allow an amount less 
than the scale.71 This means the primary basis relied upon by Master Wood and McGill 
DCJ in reaching their decisions in Merringtons and Hennessey Glass respectively, does 
not apply in Queensland. 
 
The test for determining costs on the indemnity scale under r 704(3) of the Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) also means that if there were no reduction for input tax 
credits claimed by the successful party on amounts referable to GST paid on professional 
fees, that party might well recover more in total than was actually paid. Clearly this 
would infringe the indemnity principle, and is in stark contrast to the likely position as 
explained by McGill DCJ in Hennessey Glass in the context of an assessment on the 
standard basis. 
 
These considerations lead to the conclusion that, at least in Queensland, professional 
costs assessed on the indemnity basis should be treated in the same way as 
disbursements, i.e. if an amount referable to GST has been paid on the solicitor’s account 
and claimed as an input tax credit, the amount recovered from the other party should be 
the amount of the professional fees net of the component of the fee reflecting the 
solicitor’s liability for GST.  
 
It may be noted this conclusion is consistent with the Commissioner’s view in Goods and 
Services Tax Ruling GSTR 2001/4. In Thornton v Apollo Nominees Pty Ltd [2005] 
TASSC 38 the taxing officer had said in relation to Goods and Services Tax Ruling 
GSTR 2001/4 that “Paragraph 145 makes it clear the ruling is limited to ‘party party 
costs’”. In his judgment Evans J did not comment specifically on this aspect of the taxing 
officer’s reasons. It is submitted, however, that the ruling is not so limited.  
 
Paragraph 145 is certainly not expressed in terms that limit the balance of the ruling to 
costs orders or settlements to be assessed on the “party party” basis, but rather is 
descriptive of the nature of the costs order which, in the ordinary course, will be made 
when a dispute is finalised. Paragraph 146 explains the usual obligation of a party to pay 
their own legal advisers “solicitor client costs”. Paragraph 147 then states:  “For the 
purposes of this Ruling, we are concerned with the subsequent stage when the successful 
party is able to recover costs wholly or partly through a court order for costs or by 
negotiation of an amount in a settlement.” Neither this explanation of the application of 
                                                 
71 It had been apparently accepted by the Court of Appeal in Beardmore v Franklins Management Services 
Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 60 that there was no difference in the Magistrates Court Scale of fees between 
indemnity costs and standard costs.  However in Asset Loan Co Pty Ltd v Mapap Pty Ltd [2005] QDC 295 
McGill DCJ concluded that costs may be recovered in Magistrates Courts on the indemnity basis. His 
Honour was satisfied his conclusion in this respect was not precluded by the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Beardmore. This view was confirmed by the Queensland Court of Appeal Amos v Monsour 
Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 235. 
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the ruling, nor the examples subsequently provided, refers to the basis on which the 
recoverable costs are to be assessed, and in particular they do not refer only to costs 
which are to be assessed on the “party party” basis. An approach with treats professional 
costs recoverable on the indemnity basis in the same way as disbursements (i.e. if an 
input credit has been obtained the costs to be recovered should be net of GST) gives 
additional scope for the Commissioner’s recommendations in the ruling.72 
 
The question whether the above analysis will apply equally well in other jurisdictions 
will depend upon close examination of the particular terms of the relevant legislation and 
rules of court in each jurisdiction73, but it is submitted that for most jurisdictions the 
likely outcome is the same.  In each case, however, it should first be considered whether 
it is necessary on an assessment of costs on the solicitor and client basis to apply scales 
prescribed by the rules, without discretion to reduce the amounts allowed, and further 
whether the costs recovered on the solicitor and client or indemnity basis will much more 
closely equate to the costs which the recovering party will have actually paid. 
 
Timing  
 
A registered entity will not be entitled to an input tax credit unless the provision of the 
relevant service to it was a “taxable supply”.74 In general terms a supply made on or after 
1 July 2000 will be a taxable supply75, although under the transitional provisions certain 
supplies made subsequent to 1 July 2000 under agreements which were entered before 
that date are GST-free.76 No supplies after 1 July 2005 (or after an earlier date when  
there has been an opportunity to review the agreement) will be GST-free77  It is important 
that any reduction on assessments of costs because of an entitlement to input credits are 
only made in respect of supplies on which GST has been paid or is payable.  
 
In Hennessey Glass78 the registrar had made a reduction of the total amount allowed to 
the plaintiff by one eleventh but the costs statement assessment began on 12 August 
1999. McGill DJC made it clear that any deduction which might be made should not 
apply prior to 1 July 2000 and that it was an error for the registrar to make a deduction 
which applied to the whole period. This is undoubtedly correct. 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
72 Goods and Services Tax Ruling GSTR 2001/4.  Goods and Services Tax: GST consequences of court 
orders and out of court settlements, paras 149, 154. 
 
73  Notes 69 and 70. 
 
74 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 ss 7-1, 11-5. 
 
75 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Transition Act 1999 s 7(1). An entitlement to an input tax 
credit only arises on an acquisition to the extent that it is made on or after 1 July 2000: s7(2). 
 
76  A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Transition Act 1999 Part 3.  
 
77 In relation to supplies on or after 1 July 2005 under long-term non-reviewable contracts the liability to 
pay the GST will in some circumstances shift to the recipient of the supply: A New Tax System (Goods and 
Services Tax) Transition Act 1999 Part 3, Division 2.  
 
78 Hennessey Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QDC 37 at [131]. 
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There are a range of potential implications of the GST legislation when costs are 
recovered under a court order or negotiated settlement.  
 
If the recovering party has paid an amount referable to GST the issues to be considered 
will include whether the amounts recovered by that party should be reduced by the 
amount of the input tax credit. The answer will depend upon the terms of the applicable 
legislation and rules of court, but may also vary for different items of recoverable costs, 
depending upon the nature of the costs and the basis on which they are assessed. There  
may be some difference in net result for parties recovering costs depending on whether or 
not they are registered entities or individuals who do not have the benefit of input tax 
credits which to offset the GST which they are liable to pay their solicitors79 but this may 
fairly be regarded as the necessary outcome of a sound application of assessment 
principles.  
                                                 
79 This difference has been perceived as a possible injustice in some of the authorities that have considered 
the issues: Keen v Telstra Corporation Limited [2006] FCA 834 at [47] per Rares J.  See also Hennessey 
Glass and Aluminium Pty Ltd v Watpac Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QDC 37 at [136] –[137]. 
 
